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To enhance insight into a war at sea, a general, aggregated and highly flexible
model of the ASW campaign is offered. This thesis provides a simple and usable
circulation model template. The generality and simplicity of the model allows for
"jointization" of an ASW campaign by allowing the user to utilize other resources to
define the force mix. The model is designed, first and foremost, to examine the change
in the marginal effectiveness of friendly ASW forces due to changes in force level, mix,
effectiveness, and employment strategies. The model is keyed to the interaction of a
threat submarine with friendly ASW forces and merchant or military shipping. Specific
features of the model provide for four unique attack regimes. The in port and operational
regimes control friendly attacks on a daily basis while the outbound and inbound regimes
control barriers by events. The campaign model is a deliverable product programmed
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The complex changes in the world over the last decade have caused a shift in the
thinking of the antisubmarine warfare (ASW) community. The Soviet submarine threat
in years past has been massive, yet relatively easy to define. Knowing the systems
confronting the ASW forces and the country that would be operating them, standard
ASW deployment plans were developed and these employment plans worked extremely
well. For the ASW community, the shift is from a nuclear submarine threat in blue water
(>300 NM from land) to a diesel submarine threat along the littoral.
Our primary ASW goals must now be:
• ensure free logistical flow of military goods and resupply,
• protection of merchant shipping, and
• control of the operating areas to include the protection of high value units.
Achieving these ASW goals will be more difficult along the littoral than the high seas.
This is especially true against the rapid mobilization of submarines from a disgruntled
third world country who chooses to disrupt shipping of a nearby nation. The invading
nation can attack in a relatively short period of time due to the short transit required.
Unprotected ships will be essentially defenseless against the invading submarines.
Antisubmarine defense takes significant resources and time.
A dramatic change in mind set must occur to fully utilize all available assets for
this "traditional-navy-mission" - ASW. It must become clear to the Air Force, Army
and Marine Corps that they no longer can ignore the consequences of an enemy's
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submarine blockade. Just as a tactical air campaign precedes the primary ground
offensive, so too must the sea lanes be secured to an uninterrupted flow of war material
before even the air campaign can begin This realization is the first step in the
"jointization" of antisubmarine warfare.
With the de-emphasizing of ASW training and equipment procurement, there will
be fewer and fewer naval forces available. Yet, third world submarine acquisition is not
seeing the same de-emphasis. A strong ASW force must come from the available assets
or be made available from joint and combined forces. The task then becomes the
development of an effective antisubmarine warfare campaign plan against any country
possessing a viable submarine threat. The flexibility and robustness of this model allows
it to be applied to any scenario that poses a submarine threat.
To rapidly respond there must be a plan for such a campaign. The aim of this
thesis is to provide a tool to the military decision-maker, a large-scale, aggregated, highly
flexible model of the ASW campaign that is not limited by force mix or tactics. The user
friendly campaign decision aid developed in this thesis provides an integrated look at all
the ASW forces' effects in concert, and the total threat of a submarine fleet to shipping
(or warships) over their operating lifetime. The deliverable graphical interface
developed in this thesis will function as the analytical tool for flexible and robust ASW
campaign analysis.
The generality and simplicity of the model allows for "jointization" of an ASW
campaign by allowing the user to utilize any available resources to define the force mix.
The model is designed, first and foremost, to examine the change in the marginal
xii
effectiveness of friendly ASW forces due to changes in force level, mix, effectiveness,
and employment strategies. The model is keyed to the interaction of a threat submarine
with friendly ASW forces and merchant or military shipping. Specific features of the
model provide for four unique attack regimes. The in port and operational regimes
control friendly attacks on a daily basis while the outbound and inbound regimes control
barriers by events. The campaign model is a deliverable product programmed using





The complex changes in the world over the last decade have caused a shift in the
thinking of the antisubmarine warfare (ASW) community. The Soviet submarine threat
in years past has been massive, yet relatively easy to define. Knowing the systems
confronting the ASW forces and the country that would be operating them, standard
ASW deployment plans were developed and these employment plans worked extremely
well. For the ASW community, the shift is from a nuclear submarine threat in blue water
(>300 NM from land) to a diesel submarine threat along the littoral.
Our primary ASW goals must now be:
• ensure free logistical flow of military goods and resupply,
• protection of merchant shipping, and
• control of the operating areas to include the protection of high value units.
Achieving these ASW goals will be more difficult along the littoral than the high seas.
This is especially true against the rapid mobilization of submarines from a disgruntled
third world country who chooses to disrupt shipping of a nearby nation. The invading
nation can attack in a relatively short period of time due to the short transit required.
Unprotected ships will be essentially defenseless against the invading submarines.
Antisubmarine defense takes significant resources and time.
The ASW campaign required in such a littoral situation must include both an
offense and a defense. An offensive portion of the ASW campaign must attack the
enemy submarine before they can strike or resupply. This may be equated to the tactic of
"attacking the archer instead of the arrow." This will be difficult if the submarine
mobilization is to be extremely rapid due to the short transit distance required by the
invading nation. Also, the attacks on shipping and resupply in the littoral will be swift
and unopposed due to the nature of the submarine (nuclear or non-nuclear). Therefore, a
defensive campaign must be equally as swift as the offensive campaign. The question is
then, how can these ASW goals be attained in the earliest stages of the war to provide the
most expedient transition to the counter invasion and destruction phase of the war? The
answer lies in full utilization of available assets and a timely response. The model
developed in this thesis provides for both of these factors.
B. PURPOSE
1. Joint ASW - Trade-Offs Of Various ASW Assets
In order for a military organization to survive in modern times, it must know the
limits of its combat and economic potential. Combat potential is more than what an
army can do in the ground war or an air force can do in an aerial bombardment. It is the
optimal use of all available forces to accomplish the mission, regardless of their
traditional role. A country's economic potential forms the limits of "all available
forces."
No traditional mission is seen as less joint or more service-unique than
antisubmarine warfare (ASW) (Linder, 1995). The following summary of a fictitious,
yet reasonable and viable scenario exemplifies Joint ASW. Traditionally thought of as a
naval mission, this article presents convincing reasons why ASW must become a joint
mission requiring full utilization of all available assets.
(Partial summary of the article entitled The Future ofJoint ASW, Linder, 1 995J
The year is 1999, North Koreanforces invaded South Korea (ROK). South Korean and
American resistance evaporated in the face of both a North Korean blitzkrieg and a
surprisingly effective use ofbattlefield chemical weapons. North Korean theater ballistic
missiles rained down on distant airfields. The smoking remnants of our proud tactical
airforces resembled those at Clark Air Field in the Philippines in 1941. Within a week,
Seoul hadfallen, andNorth Koreanforces were 50 miles south of the 38th Parallel.
It was thought to be another Kuwait. We would demand a return of captured
land, threaten consequences, build up a response force, and then roll them back.
Everyone thought the North Koreans would wilt. No one was prepared for such an
effective use of diesel submarines. No credible regional submarine threat had been
mounted in more than 50 years, and most thought the US Navy could easily squash a
force ofantiquated diesel submarines.
At the start of the war, the US lost four ships from a maritime prepositioning
squadron within sight of Pusan harbor. Resupply and reinforcement by sealift froze.
Without a guarantee of the arrival of their heavy-lift equipment by sealift, Army troops
began piling up at their transshipment airheads in the United States. To add to the mass
disruption, the Navy ordered three aircraft carrier battle groups out of the Sea ofJapan
until safety could be assured; Air Force tactical aircraft stayed at distant rear bases in
Japan and Okinawa until sufficient aviationfuel and ordnance at their Korean air bases
could be stockpiled
The Navy said it could not guarantee sealift resupply until D-Day +30. But
North Koreans were pouring south in corps strength. The Navy needed to flush the subs,
organize escort, and sanitize the approach routes. The Army insisted it did not have 30
days to sit on their hands waitingfor the Navy to scare away afew clunky old subs.
Two divisions had already been airliftedfrom the States. The troops had to have
their equipment, they could not wait 30 days. Everything depended on resupply but unlike
Desert Storm the luxury ofa slow and unopposed buildup was not available. It was the
Navy role in a major regional conflict to assist the buildup ofArmy power. But the US
Navy had few forces to commit. Meager ASW assets in theater were immediately
deployed: A few nuclear submarines deployed to patrol areas off the Korean coast;
land-based aircraft launchedfrom Japanese bases; and precious escort ships sailed to
barrier patrols and with convoys.
U. S. Navy forces began to score submarine kills, but Coalition shipping losses
continued to mount. Two Army Prepositioning Afloat (APA) ships, three chartered
tankers, and two scarce amphibious transports fell victim to enemy torpedoes or
submarine-laid mines within a week 's time.
To increase enemy submarine attrition even more Navy ASW forces were
demanded— but there were none to tap. Naval surface combatants were stretched to the
limit, filling other missions of the Coalition plan that competed with ASW assignments:
traditional gunfire support, Tomahawk cruise missile strikes, or the new task of
protecting against enemy theater ballistic missiles.
The answer to this dilemma "was": Antisubmarine warfare must be analyzed
from a joint warfighting perspective.
A nation with a submarine force can quickly become a threat to any country's
commerce and logistics lifeline. Even vintage diesel submarines can cripple a supply
line for weeks.
"No other single weapon available to the world's regional powers today




2. The Need For A Flexible ASW Model
A dramatic change in mind set must occur to fully utilize all available assets for a
"traditional-navy-mission" ~ ASW. It must become clear to the Air Force, Army and
Marine Corps that they no longer can ignore the consequences of an enemy's submarine
blockade. Just as a tactical air campaign precedes the primary ground offensive, so too
must the sea lanes be secured to an uninterrupted flow of war material before even the air
campaign can begin This realization is the first step in the "jointization" of
antisubmarine warfare.
To provide historical backing: Analysis of RAF data from World War II
shows where British bombers were integrated into the anti-U-boat patrols
in the Atlantic. Long range RAF Sutherland, Liberator, and Catalina
aircraft and shorter-range Willington, Whitley, Maruader, and Hudson
aircraft accounted for 247 of the reported 781 U-boat losses in the
Atlantic. Ships and aircraft working in tandem destroyed another 32
submarines.
(MacMillan, 1950)
The "traditional-navy" ASW platforms are submarines, maritime patrol aircraft (MPAs),
and surface ASW ships and their aerial complement. Non-traditional ASW platforms
could be Air Force F-117s, B-52s and tankers, Marine Harriers and helicopters, and
SOCOM special forces. Joint ASW tactics could include submarine port bombing, radar
flooding, satellite system targeting, and harbor mining.
To rapidly respond there must be a plan for such a campaign. This aim of this
thesis is to provide a tool to the military decision-maker, a large-scale, aggregated, highly
flexible model of the ASW campaign that is not limited by force mix or tactics. The user
friendly campaign decision aid developed in this thesis provides an integrated look at all
the ASW forces' effects in concert, and the total threat of a submarine fleet to shipping
(or warships) over their operating lifetime. The deliverable graphical user interface
developed in this thesis will function as the analytical tool for flexible and robust ASW
campaign analysis.
3. The Needs Of Combined Forces Command - Korea
Much like nuclear weapons, the submarine was and is a weapon that can frighten
even the largest of powers, and proliferation is continuing. If old submarines can be
viewed as such a threat, consider the fact that diesel submarines like the Russian Kilo and
the German Type 209 are being made available to almost any country with the money. Is
it any wonder that the North Korean submarine force, the third largest in the world, is
considered the greatest obstacle to rapid resupply and the timely destruction of a North
Korean invasion of Republic of Korea?
The tense nature of the region, the unstable state of the armistice and close
proximity to North Korea's powerful submarine force deems the Republic of Korea as a
nation in need of a joint ASW campaign model. The Combined Forces Command -
Analysis Branch, Republic of Korea is the sponsor of the original intent of this model. It
was their desire that the North Korean submarine threat be analyzed by Naval
Postgraduate School students and faculty.
The Korean War scenario in Chapter I presents realistic expectations that a North
Korean invasion will be rapid and possibly unorthodox. Resupply from the sea will
probably be interrupted by submarines, North Korean and/or some other nation. If only
limited assets are available, the ROK will need to quickly develop a Joint and Combined
ASW plan. The model presented in this thesis is the analytical tool that is flexible and
robust enough to develop such a timely campaign.
C. MODEL APPLICABILITY
The model is not limited to the Korean MRC (major regional conflict) but could
be used for any scenario that involves a submarine fleet, that of Red China for example.
With the de-emphasizing of ASW training and equipment procurement, there will be
fewer and fewer naval forces available. Yet, third world submarine acquisition is not
seeing the same de-emphasis. A strong ASW force must come from the available assets
or be made available from joint and combined forces. The task then becomes the
development of an effective antisubmarine warfare campaign plan against any country
possessing a viable submarine threat. The flexibility and robustness of this model allows
it to be applied to any scenario that poses a submarine threat.
The model can be applied to scenarios where:
• pre-war or post-war analyses are
required,
• on-going war analysis is required,
• single patrol or single submarine
campaign is desired,
• multiple patrol or multiple op area
campaign is desired,
• force allocation is desired,
• littoral and open water analysis are
desired,
• any specific starting or stopping
point is desired,
• the submarine platform varies,
• the number of submarines varies,
• submarine tactics vary,
• deployment schedules vary,
• ASW tactics vary,
• campaign aggregation is desired,
• varying coalition forces will be
employed.
(Throughout this thesis and when using the model, the term red submarine can be




The primary modeling effort of this thesis focuses on the construction of an ASW
campaign template that is easy to understand and use. The Jack Hall (1969) circulation
model was the initial basis for the campaign template. A circulation model with multiple
barriers is necessary to incorporate all possible traditional naval ASW assets along with
as many joint elements that can be made available to the ASW mission. In template
form, these will be nothing more than simple aggregated probability of kill inputs.
In order to use the Joint-ASW Model GUI, various survival probabilities of an
enemy (red) submarine must be known based on the friendly (blue) ASW combat
effectiveness in four different regimes. The regimes for attack are:
• In port (prior to departure),
• Outbound (enroute to the op area),
• Op areas, and
• Inbound (enroute to the red submarine port).
The ASW forces can range from none to a large aggregation of subsurface, surface, air,
and space resources. A single ASW "barrier" can include naval as well as joint and
combined service components which contribute to the ASW campaign. The objective of
the ASW barrier must be to kill the red submarine during its transit. This equates to
increased survivability of friendly ships. It is important to note that shipping protection
can be accomplished in many ways, to include delaying the red submarine, knowing
where the red sub is located to avoid it and of course localizing and killing it. The delays
which may be accomplished by repair facility bombing or delays while overt mines are
swept are not directly accounted for in the model. These tactics may be indirectly
accounted for in the number of days or events endured by the red submarine in a
particular regime.
The equations presented in this section are derived from a simple circulation
model. ASW resources can be used alone or as a coordinated barrier. The probability of
survival through any single "barrier attack" must be determined by separate tactical
analysis prior to execution of the model. This requires:
1. A pre-determination of the forces available to the ASW barrier and
2. A knowledge of how the aggregation of forces defines the probability of
survival of the red submarine through the barrier.
Along with this determination, it is important that the user have a variety of barrier
packages defined as survival probabilities. This will allow the user to best determine
how the available ASW assets can be mixed and their performance enhanced.
The model depicts one red submarine's single operational cycle. The cycle is then
used as the skeleton for the blue ASW campaign. The equations used follow classical
circulation models like those developed by Philip Morse and George Kimball (1946),
Jack Hall (1969), and Brian McCue (1990). For simplicity, the time steps in the model
are one day in both the submarine port and the operational areas while the outbound and
inbound regime time steps are one "event. " For instance, two "similar" air attacks is
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Figure 1. Basic circulation model for an ASW campaign. Note: The number of
attacks presented serves to illustrate that multiple attacks are possible.
Figure 1 illustrates a red submarine operation cycle and the blue ASW campaign
to combat it. For instance, a red submarine spends a number of days in port (6 days are
depicted in the Figure 1). While in port, it is subject to daily in port attacks. The
probability that it survives is a function of the number of days spent in port and daily
survival rate, which is affected by the magnitude of the blue offensive. Surviving the in
port attacks, the red submarine begins to transit toward its operational area. Along the
way, the blue forces have assembled various ASW barriers. (Four barriers are depicted in
the Figure 1.) The outbound barrier's effectiveness is a function of the capabilities of the
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barrier, the ASW attacks during the sub transit of the barrier, and the number of barriers.
These barriers will be explained in more detail in a later section.
When the red submarine arrives in its operational area, it is subject to attrition by
ASW forces in the op area each day it remains there. In addition to the daily
effectiveness of blue offensive ASW forces, the probability of red survival in the op area
is a function of the engagement rate of the submarine and the blue screen's capability.
The screen must detect and then prosecute based on the detection. Once the red
submarine leaves the op area it is again subject to ASW barriers during its return transit
to port. The cycle is complete when the red submarine reaches port. The expected
number of attacks it makes and the probability of kill for the cycle is recorded.
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B. REGIMES - DEFINITIONS AND EQUATIONS
The equations are broken down into the four regimes (shown in gray): in port
attacks, outbound barriers, operational areas, and inbound barriers. Figure 2 shows an
example of the user's data form. It is used for data input, viewing a record of output and
accessing other forms such as help files and the data set being created.
The input regimes depicted in Figure 2 in the dark gray boxes are described in
detail below Each regime description below is encapsulated in a light gray box like
this to provide continuity and clarity The equations for each regime are presented to
provide an understanding of how the results are determined. The final section of-..this
chapter provides the equations for the calculated Results (shown in the green box). The
term record refers to a data set entry consisting of inputs and results an entire patrol
calculation. Each time the "Calculate" button is clicked a new record is created that can
be added to the data set. (See the Appendix A for data base navigation.)
(The numberspresented in thefollowing descriptions ofinput and output arejust
an example and do not represent a real world campaign.)
The reader is reminded that this is an expected value model and the compounded
results are expected (mean) values.
13
Figure 2. Example of ASW circulation model main data form. This form is used for
inputting parameters, calculations, viewing a single record and accessing other features such
as viewing datasets and getting help.
14

1. Initial Red Sub Fraction
The nature of the model provides for multiple runs of the model or aggregated
campaigns. For a typical first run or patrol of a red submarine force the initial red sub
fraction is one
! Initial Red Sub Fraction
1
Figure 3. Example of user input for the initial red submarine fraction box
When the red submarine force has been attrited by one or more previous patrols, then the
initial red subfraction becomes the expected uredfraction remaining" from the previous
run. The "redfraction remaining" is given in the green results box.
Red Fraction
Remaining I 0.67661
Figure 4. Example of output for the fraction of red submarine force remaining
2. In Port Regime
For simplicity of the model, only attacks against the red submarine are of interest.
As mentioned previously only direct attacks are accounted for in the model calculations
Examples of direct attacks on a submarine are bombing, missile attack, and hull mining.
Less direct and effective attacks must be accounted for by increased in port time due to
bombing of submarine piers, repair facilities, weapon storage facilities, communication





P(Survival) := qPort = Probability of survival of the red submarine in port
# Days := Dport == Number of Days the red submarine spends in port
IN PORT ATTACK
PCSuwiral) 0.999 #Days 20
Figure 5. Example of user input for the in port attack box
The in port survival formulation is: qlnPort = qPort Dport (1)
The model formulation to this point is:
PSubSimMnPort = (1- Redlnit • qlnPort) (2)
3. Outbound Regime
The outbound barriers can take the form of any anti-submarine tactic that hinders
the red submarine's progress to its op area. Examples include harbor and sea lane
mining, traditional Naval ASW consisting of submarines, P-3s, destroyers, and others,
and various assets used for C4ISR such as aircraft and satellites for communication
interception and reconnaissance. Any of these assets can be used alone or as an
aggregated barrier. The probability of survival through any barrier must be determined
by the user prior to execution of the model. This will require a prior determination of the
assets to be assigned to the ASW barrier which in turn determines the probability of
survival of the red submarine passing through the barrier. Along with this determination
it is important that the user have a variety of barrier survival probabilities for various
16








= Probability of red sub surviving one blue attack event in barrier i
# Events := NOut = Number or type of events of the outbound barrier
An example of the outbound formulation for 4 barriers is:
qOutf • qOut2 • qOutl • qOutA
where the first barrier has 2 events, the second and fourth have 1 event, and the third has
5 events.
OUTBOUND BARRIERS i
Event Description P( Survival) # Tsr&nis
Figure 6. Example of user input for the outbound barrier box
The Outbound survival formulation is:
••' Out
qOutbound - I I qOutp
i=l
(3)
where qOut? is the probability ofsurvivalfor barrier i, n
t
is the number ofdays in
barrier i and NQut is the number or type ofOutbound barriers.
The model formulation to this point is:
PSubSunkOutbound = Redlnit • qlnPort •(!- qOutbound) (4)
4. Operational Area Regime
The operational area of the blue forces is defined as the area where the blue ships
will operate, loiter and seek targets to attack. It is the objective destination of the red
17
submarine. The blue ASW campaign objective is to successfully operate in this area
while minimizing ship loss to red submarines.
Merchant or cargo vessels are generally thought of as defenseless against a
submarine. They can travel independently or in convoys, with protective escort or
without. High value units (HVU) such as aircraft carriers, while somewhat defenseless













Figure 7. Wire diagram of red submarines' transit through a blue Operational Area.
OP AREA ATTACK
User entries:
P(Survive Offensive) := qOff = Probability of red sub surviving daily offensive ASW
P(Screen Detects Sub) :- Pd = Probability blue screen detects the red sub that attempts
to attack a target
P(Red Killed | Blue Detects) := Pk|d = Probability blue kills red given red is detected
18

Daily # of Engagements := Engage = Number of red attacks plus blue detections based
on a daily rate or number of attempted attacks by red sub per day
# Red Days in Op Area := Dop = Number of days the red sub spends in operational
area (model assumes sub does not exhaust its torpedoes)
OP ARFA ATTAPK
PCSuivire Blue Daily Offensive) 0.98 |






Daily # ofEngagements 21
\
# Red Days ia Op Area 10
Figure 8. Example of user input for the operational area attack box
Useful relations:
(1 - qOff) = Probability of red sub being killed by (daily) offensive ASW
Pd • Pk\d = Probability of red sub being killed by a screen attack
(1 - Pd • Pdk\d) = Probability ofred sub surviving a screen attack
Daily Probability of Red Sub Being Sunk in the Op Area
Engage-]
PSubSunkOnlstDay = (1 - qOjf) + qOff •Pd*Pk\d* £ (1 - Prf • Pk\d) 1
i=0
(5)
let qDailyOpArea = 1 - PSubSunkOnlstDay
Probability of Red Sub Being Sunk in the Op Area
Dop-\




If < Engage <1 then the daily probability of the red sub being sunk is handled
in a special way explained below. If the number of days in the op area is less than one,
then these probabilities are zero. IfEngage =0 but Dop >= J then the red submarine is
being killed only by the screen and the probability of the red sub being sunk is:
Dop-\
Redlnit • qlnPort • qOutbound • ]ST (1 - qOffy
;=o
(6b)
Equation 6a or 6b is the equation to this point.
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Attacks Achieved:
Daily Op Area Attacks Achieved by the Red Sub
Engage-l
DailyAttacksAchieved = qOff •{\-Pd)* J^(l-Pd* Pk\d) k
k=0
(7)
Total Op Area Attacks Achieved by the Red Sub:
Dop-l
Redlnit • qlnPort • qOutbound • DailyAttacksAchieved • ]T qOjf m
m=0
(8)
Fractional Number of Engagements:
The model allows for the case where the number of engagements is between 0.0
and 1.0 since a fractional number in this range seems realistic for a daily engagement
rate. Fractional values greater than one are not allowed but whole attacks per day (2, 3,
4, ...) are permitted. The fractional case is handled by adjusting the daily offensive ASW
and the number of days the red sub spends in the op area. This allows the number of
engagements (Engage) to take on the integer value 1 which is necessary for the software
programming. The new values become:
Engage is a fraction so Engage* => 1,
qOff* = qOff/ Engage,
Dop* = Dop / Engage.
This summation assumes that the number of engagements is greater than zero. If
the number of engagements is zero then the model accounts for this by ignoring the
engagement term.
5. Inbound Regime
The inbound barriers can take the form of any anti-submarine tactic that hinders




Event Description := Text description of barrier
P(Survival) := qui,- = Probability of red sub surviving one blue attack event in barrier /'
# Events := NIn = Number of events of the Inbound barrier
INBOUND BARRIERS







Figure 9. Example of user input for the Inbound barrier box





where qlnp is theprobability ofsurvivalfor barrier i, n
i
is the number ofdays in
barrier i and NIn is the number or types ofInbound barriers.
Letting:
• qlnPort = 1 - PSubSunklnPort,
• qOutbound = 1 - pSubSunkOutbound,
• qOpArea = 1 - PSubSunklnOpArea
the equation to this point becomes:
PSubSunHnbound = Rsdlnit • qlnport • qOutbound • qOpArea • (1 - qlnbound) ( 1 0)
6. Output Results
The probability results can be interpreted as the fraction, on the average, of the
red submarine force remaining after one patrol or cycle. The user must decide if the
submarine threat has been sufficiently reduced in this one patrol based on the desires and
capabilities of the campaign plan. Also considered must be the number of attacks the red
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submarine is able to achieve keeping in mind the simplifying assumption that the red
submarine has a sufficient arsenal to conduct the calculated number of attacks achieved.
Record RESULTS
P(Sub Sunk)
In Port I 0.01981 Op Area I 0.25527 InBound I 0.02495
OutBound 02335 1st Day 03056 Total Patrol f 32339
Daily




Figure 10, Example of user output for the record results box
P(Sub Sunk):
In Port := Probability the sub is sunk in port after Npori days in port
PSubSunklnPort = 1 - Redlnit • qPort Nport
Outbound = Probability the sub is sunk in an outbound barrier
PSubSunkOutbound = Redlnit • qlnPort • (1 - qOutbound)
(11)
(12)
Op Area - First Day := Probability sub is sunk the first day in the operational
area
Engage-}
PSubSunkOnlstDay = (1 - qOjf) + qOff *Pd* Pk\d • ]T (1 - Pd • Pk\dy
2=
(13)
Op Area :- Probability sub is sunk in the operational area
PSubSunklnOpArea =
Inbound := Probability sub is sunk in an inbound barrier
PSubSunklnbound = Redlnit • qlnport • qOutbound • qOpArea • (1 - qlnbound) (15)
Total := Total probability sub is sunk {entire patrol}
TotalPSubSunk - 1 - Redlnit • qlnport • qOutbound • qOpArea • qlnbound ( 1 6)
Attacks Achieved:
Daily :== Number of daily attacks achieved
Engage-}





Total := Total number of attacks achieved
Dop-\




C. SOFTWARE AND CODING
The Joint Anti-Submarine Warfare Model uses a graphical user interface (GUI)
created in Borland Delphi™ for Microsoft Windows . It requires Windows 3.x or
later to run the executable file, 16-bit and 32-bit versions are available.
This model is written to evaluate an ASW campaign utilizing various assets in
ASW roles. The model provides the user an interface to enter the survival probabilities
along with other related campaign parameters based on available ASW resources. The
user is then provided as output the survival probabilities in three regimes, an overall
survival prediction of the red submarine as well as the number of daily and total attacks
the red submarine can achieve. Finally, the input and output are stored as a data base for
further evaluation. This information can aide in determining force mix while providing
an idea of how much of a submarine attack the blue forces are willing to endure.
Once the model was structured it was made interactive using the low level
computer programming language PASCAL in Delphi. Other programming languages,
analysis tools or graphical interfaces could have been used in a similar fashion. The
ability of the model to be dynamic and interactive allows the user to easily tailor his
ASW campaign forces to the model regimes. Along with applying traditional and joint
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ASW assets, new ASW employment and tactics specifically designed for the areas along
the littoral could easily be analyzed.
The user's manual (Appendix B) provides instructions of how the model can be
applied to a campaign. The instructions inform the user of the flexibility of the input
parameters allowing use of all available assets as well as the ability to easily incorporate
new technologies as they become available. A working knowledge of how various
probabilities of kills and ASW barrier strategies is assumed and necessary for valid data
input and interpretation of the results. (A description of a circulation model and survival
probabilities is presented in McCue, 1990.) Along with the application of assets, the
varying of the asset mix to achieve the best possible ASW strategy without drawing too
many assets from other areas of the campaign is explained. This critical mixing is the
key to the joint applicability of the model. All available assets must be "fully" utilized.
If some assets are over utilized by one facet of the war then the attempt at full utilization
is wrong. For example, if B-52s are allocated to the ground campaign for large area
bombing when the ground war is actually being delayed because enemy submarines are
slowing the resupply effort then B-52s are not being properly utilized. Using the B-52s
for a few days of submarine port bombing or harbor mining may be a better way to fully
utilize available assets. The same is true if B-52s are performing ASW missions when
the ground campaign is the primary focus of attack. This is the mind-set the model user
must achieve to begin to tap the benefits of a joint ASW model.
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D. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE MODEL INTERFACE
Due to a number of factors, including time and inexperience with the software,
certain shortcomings of the usable model exist which must be known. These
shortcomings are simply issues that the user should be aware of when using this
analytical tool.
1. Limited Input Value Ranges
Abnormal values such as probabilities less than zero are not allowed by the
model. The model will only accept values in the allowed ranges. The user will receive
an error message and be prompted for another input if a value is outside the allowed
range.
The ranges of allowed values are:
• AH probabilities and "Initial Red Sub Fraction" = {0.0, 1 .0},
• Number of days and events = {0, 999} (this must be an integer
value),
• Number of engagements = {0.0, 1 .0} and {1 , 99} (integer values
>1)
• Event descriptions = 20 characters or less
• Memo Record = 50 characters or less
The default parameters are such that not all of the input parameters need to be
entered. The data is entered in a screen which is defined as the main form of the model.
All other screens or forms can be accessed from the main form. In order to input data,
the user simply clickc on the desired input box and types a value. It may be necessary to
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that is already in the box by backspacing or highlighting and deleting the value. It is
possible to tab through the input boxes and enter values without having to delete old
values.
2. Number Of Days And Engagements Per Day
Some values such as the number of days must be an integer value since these
values are part of a summation or product index which is handled by program looping.
The same is true of the number of engagements for values greater that or equal to one.
The special case where the number of engagements is a fraction in the range of {0.0, 1.0}
is coded by number manipulation and then rounding the value of the number of
engagements to one. This number manipulation explained in detail in the section on "Op
Area Attack. " This fractional range from 0.0 to 1.0 was deemed important and easily
codable for the model, but whole numbers greater than one are allowed.
3. Limited Number Of Barriers
Only four outbound and inbound barriers are allowed for a single patrol due size
limitations of the input screen. This has, thus far, not been a problem for any verification
campaigns.
4. Simple Help Files
The graphical interface does not allow the use of pull down menus like some
software products because of time and the complexity of the coding required to
accomplish these tasks. The help available to the user during the running of the model
consists of a number of scrollable text files. If this is insufficient then the user's manual
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(Appendix A) or this thesis can be used.
5. Rounding Output
Values had to be rounded to five decimal places to fit on the main form screen.
This should not be a problem given the accuracy of most probability information.
6. Time Steps
The selection of daily and event time steps is based on convenience and is
supported by previous models (Eagle, 1987) and (Washburn, 1980). The time step need
not be one 24 hour day but simply a convenient unit of time that is consistent for all
regimes. For example, a time step of one hour can be used provided that each regime
uses the same time step. This can be done by adjusting the value for the number "days "
in port, "days" in the op area, and the "daily" number of engagements to hours. The
number of barrier events must also be adjusted accordingly. This may be another way to
account for a fractional engagement rate.
7. What The Model Does Not Know In The Op Area
The model is not able to know if the red submarine has sufficient weapons to
continue attacking for the inputted number of days in the operational area. Along these
lines, the model cannot know if the red submarine would interrupt its attack cycle due to
damage or some other reason. The damage in hits achieved by a red submarine attack is
not a part of the model. Instead, just the number of attacks are tallied and the user must
decide how many merchant ships or warships were put out of action or sunk in each
attack. Also, the time required for individual engagements cannot be easily inputted into
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the model. Only a single daily engagement rate can be handled by the model.
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III. MODEL VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION
Verification was achieved by trying each regime in isolation and comparing
results with hand calculations. The entire model was then exercised and compared with
hand calculations of aggregated model inputs. The verification numbers used were
deemed reasonable to ASW trained personnel. The intent of verification was to simply
test that the model produced results that correspond to the equations and event flows in
the model. Validation consisted of inputting reasonable values to see that reasonable
results ensued.
Presented in the subsections of this chapter are two campaigns. The testing is
presented here as a series of tests. First, the in port regime was tested by itself. Second,
the model was tested by adding the outbound regime to the in port regime. Third, the
model was tested for an entire patrol and finally, the model was tested for multiple
campaigns patrols or an aggregated campaign. Each time the model was tested, the
legitimacy of the results was verified by hand calculations.
A. ISOLATED REGIME
Assuming a direct attack against a submarine in port would not be very effective
the probability of survival, qPort, would be quite large, for example qPort = 0.999. For
the simple case of a submarine spending one day in port, the total probability of the
submarine surviving is just:
qPort
1
= qPort = 0.999.
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In words, 98 percent of the submarine force will be leaving the red submarine port to
conduct the rest of the patrol. In terms of the probability that the submarine is sunk,
PSubSunMnPort = 1-0.98 = 0.02
or 2 percent of the submarine force was destroyed by in port attacks.
B. MULTIPLE REGIMES
Continuing with this 98 percent of a red submarine force, various blue barriers
are staged to weaken the submarine threat along the outbound transit to the objective
destination, the operational area. The outbound regime time steps are "events." Along
the outbound transit, B-52s have laid a minefield which has a 0.4 percent chance of kill
and is defined to be one event. Another outbound barrier encountered is a blue fast
attack submarine which has a one percent chance of kill for each of its two attacks it
conducts. Summarizing these two outbound barriers:
Minefield: qOutl = 1 - 0.004 = 0.996, 1 event
Attack Sub: qOut2 = 1 - 0.010 = 0.99, 2 events
Outbound Survival Probability: qOutbound = qOut 1 • qoutl2
= 0.996 «0.99 2
= 0.976
The probability the sub is sunk during the outbound transit is:
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qlnPort • (1 - qOutbound) - 0.98 • (1 - 0.976) = 0.023
In words, 97.7 percent of the red submarine force will continue to the operational area
regime to attack the blue forces. If the patrol did not continue to the operational area the
blue force achieved a total probability of kill, PSubSunkTotal = 1 - 0.977 = 0.023 or 2.3
percent attrition of the red submarine force.
C. FULL PATROL / SINGLE CAMPAIGN
Continuing with the example, next 97.7 percent of the red submarine force enters
the operational area, blue ASW forces launch daily offensive attacks using MPA, Harrier
reconnaissance, and coalition ASW submarines. The probability that the red submarine
survives each daily offensive attack is qOff = 0.98. If the blue force does not have a
screen, which will be the case for independently sailing merchant ships, then the
probability that the submarine, is detected during an attack is zero. However, for this
campaign we use a screen consisting of a cruiser, a destroyer and an S-3 yielding a
probability of detecting the red submarine force, Pd = 0.06, and a probability of kill
given detection, Pk\d = 0.09. For such a weak screen, 2 engagements per day by the red
sub (Engage) seem possible. We further estimate that the red submarine force will




PSubSunkOnlstDay = (1 - qOjf) + qOff • Pd*Pk\d* £(1- Pd*Pk\d) j
i=0
2-1
= (1 - 0.98) + 0.98 • 0.06 • 0.09 •£ (1 - 0.06 • 0.09)'
7=0
= 0.031
The probability that the sub is sunk in the operational area (ignoring previous
attrition) over its entire 10 day patrol is:
Dop-\
PSubSunklnOpAreaAlone = PSubSunkOnlstDay £(1- PSubSunkOnlstDay) J
10-1
= 0.03 1 • J](i- 003 \y
= 0.267
Therefore, the probability that the red submarine force survives op area attacks is:
qOpArea = 1 - PSubSunklnOpAreaAlone
= 1 - 0.267 = 0.733
Including the previous attrition:
PSubSunklnOpArea = qlnPort • qOutbound • (1 - qOpArea)
= 0.98* 0.976 •(1-0.733)
= 0.255
Leaving the operational area, the red submarine force must transit through one
inbound barrier of P-3s. A 7.2 percent chance of kill exists for each of its 3 events
conducted. Summarizing this inbound barrier:
P-3 barrier: qlnl = 1-0.012 = 0.988, 3 events





After accounting for the fact that some subs have already been sunk the probability that
the submarine is sunk by the inbound barrier is:
PSubSunldnbound = qlnPort • qOutbound • qOpArea • (1 - qlnbound)
= 0.98 • 0.976* 0.733* (1 - 0.964)
= 0.025
The total patrol survival probability after the four regimes is:
qlnPort • qOutbound • qOpArea • qlnbound
= 0.98 • 0.976* 0.733 • 0.964
= 0.676
In words, 67.6 percent of the red submarine force will complete the entire patrol. The
total probability of kill achieved on the port-to-port cycle is:
PSubSunkTotal = 1-0.676 = 0.324
or 32.4 percent attrition of the red submarine force for its first round trip.
Also of importance is the number of attacks the red submarine force is able to
achieve. These attacks are conducted in the blue operational area when an engaging red
submarine is not detected by the screen. The calculations are dependent on how much of
the red submarine force is available daily in the operational area to conduct attacks.
Since we have specified that two attacks per submarine are possible, the number of red
submarine attacks achieved on the first day are:
Engage- 1
DailyAttacksAchieved = qOff •(\-Pd)* £ (1 - TV • Pk\d) k
k=0
2-1




The total number of attacks per sub achieved during its 10 days in the op area is:
Dop-\
TotalAttacksAchieved = qlnPort • qOutbound • DailyAttacksAchieved • J] qOff'
10-1
= 0.980 • 0.976 • 1.84• £o.98M
m=0
= 16.1
Simple Patrol Campaign Summary: The ASW campaign killed approximately
32 percent of the submarine force during its round trip, and each sub achieved
approximately 16 attacks. We do not say how many ships in a convoy may be torpedoed
on the average by each sub attack. For instance, it may fire a salvo of 6 torpedoes and hit
2.5 merchant ships for a total of 40 ships torpedoed. Achieving most (26.7%) of the
attrition in the blue operational area where the red submarine force spends most of its
time makes sense for the inputs in the example. However, the user would challengein his
own mind whether the sub capable of making 16 attacks and hitting 40 ships would
actually do so. If he fires 6 torpedoes per attack he would have to carry 96 torpedoes to
sea!
D. MULTIPLE PATROL / AGGREGATED CAMPAIGN
A multiple patrol campaign test is next demonstrated to analyze how various
forces can best be used. Achieving the proper force mix based on the available assets is a
fundamental goal of running the model. Using the above example as the base campaign,
various changes are described below and the results summarized in the table which
follows.
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Campaign 1 (Attrition) : Using the base campaign described in the previous sections,
67.7 percent of the red submarine force remain, a campaign of continuing attrition is
conducted.
Campaign la: (Remaining red submarine force = 0.677)
I. Reduced bombing of the submarine port coupled with only a short in
port period.
2. B-52 minefield is replenished but is not as effective because of enemy
intelligence.
3. P-3 attack becomes an outbound vice an inbound barrier.
$fc Op Area offensive becomes slightly more efficient at killing the red
submarines.
5. JSTARS intelligence is added to the screen effectiveness.
6. The number of engagements per day decreases because of the increased
complexity of the forces in the op area.
Campaign lb: (Remaining red submarine force = 0.464)
1 . Ten day in port period.
% B-52 minefield is not replenished and therefore is less effective.
3. Op Area offensive is enhanced by a cruiser.
4. SSN is added to the screen.
5. P-3 attack and a coalition SS barriers are added to the inbound regime.
-cr'
At the end of campaign lb only 20.7 percent of the red submarine force
remains.
Campaign 2: Using the base campaign described in previous sections, a
campaign involving a submarine assault against a second and third operational
area is conducted. Only the in port, outbound, and operational regimes from the
original example will be used. Since the red submarine force is not returning to
port after the first and second operational areas the inbound regime will be
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ignored. The outbound regime will be used for enroute barriers between the
operational area regimes. The red submarine force will pass through the inbound
barrier after the final operational area. The op area of Campaign 2a is for
merchants while the op area for 2b is for an aircraft carrier.
Campaign 2a: (Remaining red submarine force = 0.702)
1
.
SSN attacks the red submarine in the outbound (enroute) regime
2. No offensive ASW because this op area is for merchants.
3. Screen is limited to a FF and one helicopter.
4. The number of engagements is high because of the small ASW force in
the op area.
Campaign 2b: (Remaining red submarine force = 0. 671)
1
.
P-3 attacks the red submarine force in the outbound (enroute) regime.
2. Air Force F-15 intelligence improves the P-3's ability to find the red
submarine and thus decrease the probability of its survival in the outbound
regime.
3. Offensive ASW consists of a cruiser and diesel submarine.
4. Screen consists of a cruiser, two destroyers, one SSN, one FFG and
two S-3s freed form refueling duty by reallocation of assets.
5. The number of engagements per day is small (0.5). To allow the
software to handle a fractional value, the number of days in the op area
and the probability of surviving daily offensive attacks (qOff) must be
altered. For 0.5 engagements/day the number of days is doubled
(Dop/fractional number of engagements) and qOff halved (qOff/fractional
number of engagements). This allows the number of engagements/day to
take on an integer value of one.'&>
6. A P-3 laid minefield is the sole barrier for the inbound regimeDJ
At the end of campaign 2b only 0.47 percent of the red submarine force
remains.
Table 1 contains the specific inputs and results for the extended campaigns
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Attrition Cam paign Multiple Op Areas
Campaign
Inputs 1 la lb 2 2a 2b
Initial Red Sub
Fraction
1 0.677 0.464 1 0.702 0.671
qPort 0.999 0.9999 0.9999 0.999 1 1
Dport 20 5 10 20
qOutl 0.996 0.998 0.999 0.996 0.985 0.9
# ofEvents 1 1 1 1 2
•^
j
qOutl 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1 1
# ofEvents 2 1 2 2
qOut3 1 0.988 1 1 1 1
# ofEvents 1
qOff 0.98 0.985 0.9 0.98 1 0.99
Pd 0.06 0.1 0.15 0.06 0.02 0.4
Pk\d 0.09 0.2 0.3 0.09 0.05 0.5
Engagements 2 1 1 2 3 0.5
Dop 10 10 5 10 5 10
qlnl 0.988 1 0.988 1 1 0.995
# ofEvents 3 2 1




In Port 0.02 0.324 0.537 0.02 0.298 0.329
Outbound 0.023 0.016 0.010 0.023 0.021 0.182
Op Area 0.255 0.196 0.241 0.255 0.010 0.484
l
sl Day 0.031 0.035 0.141 0.031 0.003 0.604
Inbound 0.025 0.005 0.000
Total 0.324 0.536 0.793 0.298 0.329 0.995
Attacks Achieved
Daily 1.84 0.60 0.36 1.84 2.060 0.199
Total 16.1 5.47 1.42 16.1 10 0.279
Red Force
Remaining
0.677 0.464 0.207 0.702 0.671 0.005
Table 1. Model verification input and output for two different campaigns
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These scenarios provide verification to the model along with examples of how the
model can be used. Other examples of campaign scenarios include:
• Pre-deployed red submarines. (Entering the model at any regime is possible
by using the default values for the undesired regimes. The default values are
such that the survival probability inputs are one, the probability of detection
and kill given detection are zero, and number of days or events are zero.)
• Single regime or tactic analyses.
• One red submarine or many red submarines.
The model is considered verified. No real world validation of an entire campaign
is possible, however, because of the complexity of the campaign. The best that can be
hoped for is to use fleet exercises and tactical models to assemble the best possible inputs
for in port, enroute and operational area effectiveness of the ASW force and of the red
submarines in detecting, closing and attacking blue shipping or naval forces.
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IV. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
"No other single weapon available to the world's regional powers today




The change in the world situation has prompted the emergence of an old problem
that was never completely solved. The diesel threat was virtually disregarded during the
development of nuclear power for submarines and the subsequent build up of the Soviet
submarine force. ASW resources throughout the 1970s and 1980s were centered on the
nuclear threat (SSNs/SSGNs) but the in the 1990s the threat has shifted to the
significantly less expensive but prevalent diesel. Better use of available assets coupled
with new tactics are required to deal with the diesel submarine.
The circulation model adapted for use in this thesis provides a flexible, robust
approach to ASW campaign analysis. To rapidly respond there must be a plan for such a
campaign. The aim of this thesis was to provide a tool to the military decision-maker, a
large-scale, aggregated, highly flexible model of the ASW campaign that is not limited
by force mix or tactics. The user friendly campaign decision aid developed in this thesis
provides an integrated look at all the ASW forces' effects in concert, and the total threat
of a submarine fleet to shipping (or warships) over their operating lifetime. The
deliverable graphical user interface is the analytical tool for flexible and robust ASW
campaign analysis.
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More specifically, the model allows for changing threats, unlimited tactics,
unlimited force mix, and varying campaign lengths. It uses fixed time steps of days and
number of events for the various regimes which seem to characterize ASW campaign
analyses. In fact, the unit of time for an entire patrol can be altered by the user if the
desired.
This thesis develops a model distributable as a graphical user interface (GUI) for
an antisubmarine warfare campaign. The use of the GUI as an analytical tool can aid in
the planning and analysis of naval and joint force mix to combat an ASW threat. The
GUI is based on the circulation model developed by Jack Hall (Hall, 1969). Instead of
limiting the user to uniquely naval assets and specific blue water tactics, this model
allows the user the flexibility to utilize all available ASW assets in any manner or tactic
desired.
The model was developed in Borland® Delphi™ for use in Microsoft®
Windows® It is distributable with a nearly empty database and the necessary
configuration software (Borland Database Engine and Reportsmith ) to set up and run
the executable file. The file can be run from a file manager or a File|Run command
window.
Some problems encountered with the model and its coding are discussed in the
previous chapter. Two notable observations of the model are:
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1.
A shortcoming of the model which is not easy to properly account for is that a
red submarine will continue to conduct engagements until the inputted number of days is
completed. This occurs regardless whether the red submarine force may have fired all its
torpedoes or whether blue targets remain in the operational area.
2. The model alone does not offer techniques for obtaining the required input
parameters. However, the text of the thesis does suggest ideas of how forces other than
naval ASW assets can be utilized in an ASW role.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Continued attention to a comprehensive campaign-wide concept of dealing with
the submarine threat is recommended. More importantly, increased analysis of the use of
non-uniquely naval ASW assets in an ASW role must be conducted. This will not be
possible until all the services including the Navy comprehend the threat of an attack
submarine, nuclear or diesel.
Regarding the Model:
1. The simplistic nature of the circulation model has its limitations. Future
development of an ASW campaign or increased complexity may overcome or
sidestep these limitations.
2. Optimization of each regime could be extremely helpful to the user's analysis.
Along this line, optimization of a particular campaign could be conducted and
incorporated into the user's manual.
3. More realistic time steps could be developed to account for varying lengths of
time in the barrier regime and the time of individual engagements.
4. The duration of the operational area regime can be improved to account for
the number of red submarine weapons and send the red submarines home
after a given number of attacks.
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Regarding the software:
1. The creation of a graphical user interface (GUI) was to make the model a
deliverable and usable product. It is not necessary to use a GUI to develop a
campaign but the software calculations are a great deal simpler and faster.
The development of a simple, user friendly is the most significant
accomplishment of this thesis.
2. Borland Delphi was chosen as the software platform because of its availability
and ease of use. A similar GUI could have been created in JAVA, Virtual
Basic or even C++. The use of these other programming mediums may yield
improved interfaces.
3. Database interaction and help pages are areas which can be improved upon to
make the model more user friendly.
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APPENDIX A. DELPHI CODE
The code supplied in this appendix is for the main project (32 bit version) and all
the forms used by the project. Other versions use the same code with the exception of
specific difference between Delphi 1 .0 and 2.0. The 16-bit versions will not have the
ReportSmith® print procedures. All the files are written in Borland® PASCAL® which is






Asw_modl in A:\Model3\ASW_MODL.PAS' {DataForm},
About in A:\Model3\ABOUT.PAS' {AboutBox},
Asw^grid in A:\Model3\ASW_GRID.PAS , {DataSummary},
Rsultgrd in A:\Model3\RSULTGRD.PAS' {ResultsForm},
Helpmain in A:\Model3\helpmain.pas' {HelpMainForm},
Hpurpose in A:\Model3\hpurpose.pas' {HModelPurpose},
Hdata in A:\Model3\hdata.pas' {HDataEntry},
Dbnav in A:\Model3\dbnav.pas' {HDBNav},



















About, Helpmain, Asw^grid, Rsultgrd,
SysUtils, WinTypes, WinProcs, Messages, Classes, Graphics, Controls,



















































































































































{ private declarations }
public











procedure TDataForm. ExitButtonClick(Sender: TObject),
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{Power function to compute the Base to the Exponent power.}
function Power(Base,Exponent: real):real;
begin














{ The procedure TDataForm.CalculateButtonClick performs the bulk of the
calculations when the "Calculate" button is clicked. It uses the
function Power(Base,Exponent: real):real to calculate the "base" to the
"exponent" power. No other functions or procedures are called by this
procedure. The input values for this procedure come from the data base
text boxes on the main form of the project. These values are entered
by the user at run time. The allowed values are determined by the data
base structure. No checks for valid input are done in this procedure.
The calculated values are rounded to 5 digits for consistent, easy to
read display. The values returned to the main form and data base are in
text format. }
var Redlnit, qlnPort, PSubSunklnPort, qOutbound, PSubSunkOutbound, qlnbound,
PSubSunklnbound, qPatrol, TotalPSubSunk, qDet, Pd, Pkd, PdPkd,
qAtk, qAtkSum, qOff, PSubSunkOnlstDay, qOpArea, PSubSunklnOpArea,
DailyAtksAchieved, TotalAtksAchievedSum, TotalAtksAchieved, qOplstDay,
RealNAtks, RealDop : Real;
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Redlnit: "Initial Red Sub Fraction".
qOff: "P(Survive Blue Daily Offensive)" in the op area,
Pd: "P(Screen Detects Sub)" in the op area,
Pkd: "P(Sub Killed|Screen Detects)" in the op area,
(The next two real variables are used for the fractional engagements loops.)
RealNAtks: Real "Daily # of Engagements" in the op area,
RealDop: Real "# Red Days in Op Area",
qlnPort: Probability the red sub survives the inport attacks,
PSubSunklnPort: Probability the red sub is sunk by inport attacks,
qOutbound: Probability the red sub survives the outbound attacks,
PSubSunkOutbound: Probability the red sub is sunk by outbound attacks,
qlnboundProbability: the red sub survives the inbound attacks,
PSubSunklnbound: Probability the red sub is sunk by inbound attacks,
qPatrol: Probability the red sub survives the all attacks (entire patrol),
TotalPSubSunk: Probability the red sub is sunk by all attacks (entire patrol),
qDet: Probability the red sub is not detected,
PdPkd: Probability the red sub is killed,
qAtk: Probability of red sub surviving blue attack in the op area,
qAtkSum: Daily op area survival probability,
PSubSunkOnlstDay: Probability the red sub is sunk on the first day in the op area,
qOpArea: Probability the red sub survives the op area attacks,
PSubSunklnOpArea: Probability the red sub is sunk by op area attacks,
DailyAtksAchieved: Number of attacks achieved daily by a red sub,
TotalAtksAchievedSum: Cumulative number of attacks achieved by a red sub,
TotalAtksAchieved: Total number of attacks achieved by a red sub,
qOplstDay: Probability of red sub surviving the first day in the op area,
Integer Variables
(The two integer variables below are used for the integer loops.)
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NAtks: Integer "Daily # of Engagements" in the op area,
Dop: integer "# Red Days in Op Area",
String Variables





qlnPort := RedInit*Power( StrToFloat(EditPInport.text),StrToFloat(EditDInport.text));
PSubSunklnPort := 1.0 - qlnPort;
PSubSunklnPortRounded :=







* Power( StrToFloat(EditPOut3.text), StrToFloat(EditEOut3.text)
* Power( StrToFloat(EditPOut4.text),StrToFloat(EditEOut4.text) );
PSubSunkOutbound := qlnPort * (1.0 - qOutbound);
PSubSunkOutboundRounded :=
FloatToStr((round(PSubSunkOutbound* 1 00000.0))/l 00000);
EditPSubSunkOutbound.text := PSubSunkOutboundRounded;
{***OPAREA***}
{Op Area Variable Definitions}
Pd := StrToFloat(EditPDet.text);
Pkd := StrToFloat(EditPKillDet.text);
PdPkd := Pd * Pkd; {Probability of sub killed by detection-attack}




qDet := 1 .0 - Pd; {Probability do not detect}
RealNAtks := StrToFloat(EditNOpAreaAttks.text);
RealDop := StrToFloat(EditDOpArea.text);











end {End of trivial condition.}
{Check for fractional engagements per day, (between 0.0 and 1.0)}
else if (RealNatks>0.0) and (RealNAtks<1.0) then
begin
qOff := qOff * RealNAtks; {Adjust qOff
}
Dop := round(RealDop * RealNatks); {Adjust Dop and convert it round to an
integer}
PSubSunkOnlstDay := (1.0-qOff) + qOfPPdPkd;
{Total Op Area Survival Probability}
qOplstDay := 1.0 - PSubSunkOnlstDay;
PSubSunklnOpArea := 0.0;
qOpArea := 0.0;
for j := to (Dop-1) do begin
qOpArea := qOpArea + Power( qOplstDayJ );
end;
PSubSunklnOpArea := qInPort*qOutbound*PSubSunkOnlstDay * qOpArea;
{Number of Daily Successful Attacks Possible by sub}
DailyAtksAchieved := qOff * qDet;
{Total number of attacks possible when sub has unlimited weapons and resolve}
TotalAtksAchievedSum := 0.0;
for k := to (Dop-1) do begin
TotalAtksAchievedSum := TotalAtksAchievedSum
+ ( DailyAtksAchieved * Power(qOff,k) );
end;
TotalAtksAchieved := qInPort*qOutbound*TotalAtksAchievedSum;
end {End of fractional condition
}
{No engagements and at least 1 day in the op area so sub attrited by screen}




end {End of no engagement condition.
}
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{At least 1 engagement/day and at least 1 day in the op area}
else if (NAtks >= 1) then {Normal Calculation}
begin
qAtkSum := 0.0; {Daily Op Area Survival Probability}
{Multiple engagements loop}
for i := to (NAtks- 1) do begin
qAtkSum := qAtkSum + Power(qAtk,i);
end;
PSubSunkOnlstDay := (1.0-qOfF) + qOff*PdPkd*qAtkSum;
{Total Op Area Survival Probability}




for j := to (Dop-1) do begin
qOpArea := qOpArea + Power( qOplstDayj );
end;
PSubSunklnOpArea := qInPort*qOutbound*PSubSunkOnlstDay * qOpArea;
{Number of Daily Successful Attacks Possible by sub}
DailyAtksAchieved := qOff * qDet * qAtkSum;
{Total number of attacks possible when sub has unlimited weapons and resolve}
TotalAtksAchievedSum := 0.0;
for k := to (Dop-1) do begin
TotalAtksAchievedSum := TotalAtksAchievedSum
+ ( DailyAtksAchieved * Power(qOff,k) );
end;
TotalAtksAchieved := qInPort*qOutbound*TotalAtksAchievedSum;
end; {End of normal condition.
}





:= FloatToStr((round(PSubSunkInOpArea* 100000.0))/1 00000);
EditPSubSunklnOpArea, text := PSubSunklnOpAreaRounded;
{ Op Area Attacks Output }
DailyAtksAchievedRounded
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:= FloatToStr((round(RedInit*DailyAtksAchieved* 1 00000.0))/l 00000);
EditDailyAtksAchieved.text := DailyAtksAchievedRounded;
TotalAtksAchievedRounded
:= FloatToStr((round(TotalAtksAchieved* 100000.0))/1 00000);
EditTotalAtksAchieved.text := TotalAtksAchievedRounded;
{*** INBOUND ***}




* Power( StrToFloat(EditPIn3.text), StrToFloat(EditEIn3.text) )
* Power( StrToFloat(EditPIn4.text),StrToFloat(EditEIn4.text) );















{ The procedure TDataForm.HelpButtonClick shows the main help form when





{ The procedure TDataForm.AboutButtonClick shows the about form when
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{ The procedure TDataForm.ViewDataClick shows the Data Summary form when





{ The procedure TDataForm.ViewResultsClick shows the Results Summary form
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{ Private declarations }
public
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{ Private declarations }
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SysUtils, WinTypes, WinProcs, Messages, Classes, Graphics, Controls,
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{ Private declarations }
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{ Private declarations }
public








If HelpRadioGroup. Items. Strings[HelpRadioGroup.ItemIndex]




If HelpRadioGroup. Items. Strings[HelpRadioGroup. Itemlndex]
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{ Private declarations }
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{ Private declarations }
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APPENDIX B. USER'S MANUAL
The user's manual contained in this appendix is distributed with the software for
the executable model. It provides a description of the model along with specifics on how
the model works. Also contained are instructions on how to load and use the graphical
interface.
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USER'S MANUAL
Version 1.0
Richard D. Feustel and Wayne P. Hughes




A JOINT CAMPAIGN ANALYSIS APPROACH TO
ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE USING A CIRCULATION MODEL
TEMPLATE
Richard D. Feustel - Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.S., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1989
B.S., Southern Illinois University-Carbondale, 1989
To enhance insight into a war at sea, a general, aggregated and highly flexible
model of the ASW campaign is offered. This thesis provides a simple and usable
circulation model template. The generality and simplicity of the model allows for
"jointization" of an ASW campaign by allowing the user to utilize other resources to
define the force mix. The model is designed, first and foremost, to examine the change
in the marginal effectiveness of friendly ASW forces due to changes in force level, mix,
effectiveness, and force employment strategies. The model is keyed to the interaction of
a threat submarine with friendly ASW forces and merchant or military shipping.
Specific features of the model provide for three unique attack regimes. The in port and
operational regimes control friendly attacks on a daily basis while the enroute regime
controls barriers by events. The campaign model is a deliverable product programmed
using Borland® Delphi" for use in Microsoft® Windows®
Master of Science in Operations Research - September 1996
Advisor: Wayne P. Hughes, Department of Operations Research
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Thesis Advisor. Wayne P. Hughes
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
DISCLAIMER
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
The reader is cautioned that computer programs developed in this research may
not have been exercised for all cases of interest. While every effort has been made,
within the time available, to ensure that the programs are free of computational and logic
errors, they cannot be considered validated. Any application of these programs without
additional verification is at the risk of the user.
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I. ASW CIRCULATION MODEL INSTALLATION GUIDE
The ASW Circulation Model software is UNCLASSIFIED. A data base which
uses the software may be classified.
A. INSTALLATION INSTRUCTIONS
1. Assumptions
a. These instructions assume that the user is familiar with the Windows
environment.
b. These instructions also assume the hard disk drive (Destination Drive) is
Drive c: and that the floppy disk drive (Source Drive) is Drive a:. If your
system is configured differently, change the Source and Destination Drive as
appropriate.
2. Installing the Software
Windows® 3.x : Loading the Executable Files
a. From the Windows Program Manager open the File Manager:
i. Double Click on Main.
ii. Double Click on File Manager.
b. Creating the ASW Circulation Model working directory:
ii. Click on the root directory (c:\)
iii. Select|File Create Directory. .
.
iv. In the name box type ASW.
v. Select the ASW directory.
c. Copying required Files to the ASW directory.
iii. Insert the ASW Circulation Model install disk into the Source Drive (a:\).
iv. Click on Drive a:.
v. Click and hold the a:\ directory and drag to the Destination Drive(cA).
vi. The following Files should be copied to the c:\ASW\ directory:
ASW3 .EXE The executable file.
IDAPI16.CFG The database configurationfile.
1
ASW.DB 77k? database file.
Windows® 3.1 : Creating the ASW Program Icon
a. Exit the File Manager.
b. From the Program Manager select File|New.
c. Select the Program Group and Click OK.
d. In the Description Box and Group File Box type ASW Circulation Model
and Click OK.
e. Select FiIe|New again.
f. Select Program Item and Click OK.
g. In the Description Box type ASW Circulation Model,
h In the Command Line Box type c:\ASW\ASW3 EXE
i. In the Working Directory Box type c:\ASW3Y
j . Click on Change Icon . .
.
k. In the File Name Box type c:\ASW\ASW3 .EXE and click OK.
1. Click OK again.
Windows® 95 and Windows® NT : Installation
a. Accessing the software:
i. Insert ASW installation disk 1 into Drive a:.
ii. Click the Start button on the Taskbar to bring up the Start menu.
iii. Select Settings, and Click on Control Panel, double-click on the
Add/Remove Programs icon,
iv. On the upper portion of the Install/Unstall tab, click on the Install
button.
b. Installing the software using Install Shield®:




ii. Windows 95 (Windows NT) will scan your Source Drive for
SETUP.EXE.
iii. The Run Installation program dialog box appears and instructs you to
verify that the Command Line information is correct. This information
should read a:\setup.exe
iv. Click Finish to start the installation process and follow the onscreen
instructions.




From the Program Manager double-click on the ASW Circulation Model
Program Group.
2. Double-click on the ASW Circulation Model Program Icon to start the model.
3 Run the model as desired.
4. Table 1 describes each form used by the model.
Windows® 95 and Windows® NT
1 Click on Programs from Start menu.
2. Select ASW Circulation Model from the cascading submenu and double-click
on the ASW Circulation Model icon to start the program.
3. Run the model as desired.
4. Table 1 describes each form used by the model.
FORM ITEM / BUTTON DESCRIPTION
Main
All buttons can be
clicked using the
mouse or pressing the




Iasw circulation model dataform Allows for input, viewing output, and
accessing all other forms.
!
Input data in the white boxes. Accessed
using the mouse or tab key.
1
_J Output for that record or patrol isdisplayed in the aqua boxes.
SALCULATE
• Click the Calculate button to compute the
output for the entered input.
Exit [ Click the Exit button to exit the program.
h|
-*\ * *, i| + |-|* |e The data base navigator allows for
navigation of the data base.
View All Data Click to view the Data Summary form.
View Results Only Click to view the Results Summary form.
Help Click to view the Main Help Menu form.
About Model Click to view the About form.
Data Summary' View All Data Allows viewing of all the data base
records, input and output.JASW Model Data Summary
Results
Summary
View Results Only Allows viewing ofjust the results section
of the database.
|ASW Model Results Form
Main Help
Menu
Help Allows viewing of basic model
information and access to all scroll-able
help topics. Provides a table of allowed
input values.
ASW Model Help Menu
<~ Model Purpose and Description Provides information regarding the
purpose of the model a basic description
of its parts.
r Data Entry and Manipulation Provides information on how data is
entered and manipulated using the main
data form.
f Navigating the Data Base Explains how data in the dataset is
accessed and how to navigate the data
base using the data base navigator.
<"" Equations Provides in-depth explanation of what
equations are used to calculate the results.
Shortcomings of the model and software
are presented here.






A dramatic change in mind set of military analysts must occur to fully utilize all
the available forces for a "traditional-navy-mission" — ASW. It must become clear to the
Air Force, Army and Marine Corps that they no longer can ignore the consequences of an
enemy's submarine blockade. Just as a tactical air campaign precedes the primary
ground offensive, so too must the sea lanes be secured to an uninterrupted flow of war
material before even the air campaign can begin This realization is the first step in the
"jointization" of anti-submarine warfare.
To provide historical backing: Analysis of RAF data from World War II
shows where British bombers were integrated into the anti-U-boat patrols
in the Atlantic. Long range RAF Sutherland, Liberator, and Catalina
aircraft and shorter-range Willington, Whitley, Maruader, and Hudson
aircraft accounted for 247 of the reported 781 U-boat losses in the
Atlantic. Ships and aircraft working in tandem destroyed another 32
submarines.
(MacMillan, 1950)
The "traditional-navy" ASW platforms are submarines, maritime patrol aircraft (MPAs),
and surface ASW ships and their aerial complement. Non-traditional ASW platforms
could be Air Force F-117s, B-52s and tankers, Marine Harriers and helicopters, and
SOCOM special forces. Joint ASW tactics could include submarine port bombing, radar
flooding, satellite system targeting, and harbor mining.
To rapidly respond there must be a plan for such a campaign. This aim of the
thesis which created this model was to provide a tool to the military decision-maker, a
large-scale, aggregated, highly flexible model of the ASW campaign that is not limited
by force mix or tactics. The user friendly campaign decision aid developed provides an
integrated look at all the ASW forces' effects in concert, and the total threat of a
submarine fleet to shipping (or warships) over their operating lifetime. The deliverable
graphical user interface developed will function as the analytical tool for flexible and
robust ASW campaign analysis.
B. MODEL APPLICABILITY
With the de-emphasizing ofASW training and equipment procurement, there will
be fewer and fewer naval forces available. Yet, third world submarine acquisition is not
seeing the same de-emphasis. A strong ASW force must come from the available assets
or be made available from joint and combined forces. The task then becomes the
development of an effective antisubmarine warfare campaign plan against any country
possessing a viable submarine threat. The flexibility and robustness of this model allows
it to be applied to any scenario that poses a submarine threat.
The model can be applied to scenarios where:pre-war or post-war analyses are
required,
on-going war analysis is required,
single patrol or single submarine
campaign is desired,
multiple patrol or multiple op area
campaign is desired,
• force allocation is desired,
• littoral and open water analysis are
desired,
• any specific starting or stopping
point is desired,
h ;
• the submarine platform varies,
• the number of submarines varies,
• submarine tactics vary,
• deployment schedules vary,
• ASW tactics vary,
• campaign aggregation is desired,
• varying coalition forces will be
employed.
(Throughout this manual and when using the model, the term "red submarine "
can be thought ofas a single enemy submarine or an entire enemy submarine pack or
force.)
The user is reminded that this is an expected value model and the
compounded results are expected (mean) values.
III. THE MODEL
The Joint ASW Circulation Model is written to evaluate an ASW campaign
utilizing various assets in ASW roles. The model provides the user an interface to enter
the survival probabilities along with other related campaign parameters based on
available ASW resources. The user is then provided as output the survival probabilities
in three regimes, an overall survival prediction of the red submarine as well as the
number of daily and total attacks the red submarine can achieve. Finally, the input and
output are stored as a database for further evaluation. This information can aide in
determining force mix while providing an idea of how much of a submarine attack the
blue forces are willing to endure.
It is hoped that follow-on research will attempt to optimize this problem to better
evaluate the Joint ASW campaign. Optimization of this topic was not conducted due to
time constraints and the ultimate focus of the initial development of the model.
A. DESCRIPTION
The primary modeling effort of this thesis focuses on the construction of an ASW
campaign template that is easy to understand and use. The Jack Hall (1969) circulation
model was the initial basis for the campaign template. A circulation model with multiple
barriers is necessary to incorporate all possible traditional naval ASW assets along with
as many joint elements that can be made available to the ASW mission. In template
form, these will be nothing more than simple aggregated probability of kill inputs.
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In order to use the graphical interface, various survival probabilities of an enemy
(red) submarine must be known based on the friendly (blue) ASW combat effectiveness
in four different regimes. The regimes for attack are:
• In port (prior to departure),
• Outbound (enroute to the op area),
• Op areas, and
• Inbound (enroute to the red submarine port).
The ASW forces can range from none to a large aggregation of subsurface, surface, air,
and space resources. A single ASW "barrier" can include naval as well as joint and
combined service components which contribute to the ASW campaign. The objective of
the ASW barrier must be to kill the red submarine during its transit. This equates to
increased survivability of friendly ships. It is important to note that shipping protection
can be accomplished in many ways, to include delaying the red submarine, knowing
where the red sub is located to avoid it and of course localizing and killing it. The delays
which may be accomplished by repair facility bombing or delays while overt mines are
swept are not directly accounted for in the model. These tactics may be indirectly
accounted for in the number of days or events endured by the red submarine in a
particular regime.
The equations presented in this section are derived from a simple circulation
model. ASW resources can be used alone or as a coordinated barrier. The probability of
survival through any single "barrier attack" must be determined by separate tactical
analysis prior to execution of the model. This will require a pre-determination of the
and their performance in the ASW barrier and how the aggregation of forces
defines the probability of survival of the red submarine as it passes through the barrier.
Along with this determination, it is important that the user have a variety of barrier
packages defined as survival probabilities. This will allow the user to best determine
how the available ASW assets can be mixed and their performance enhanced.
The model depicts one red submarine's single operational cycle. The cycle is then
used as the skeleton for the blue ASW campaign. The equations used follow classical
circulation models like those developed by Philip Morse and George Kimball (1946),
Jack Hall (1969), and Brian McCue (1990). For simplicity, the time steps in the model
are one day in both the submarine port and the operational areas while the outbound and
inbound regime time steps are one "event. " For instance, two "similar" air attacks equal




































(Multiple red days in op area)
Figure 1. Basic circulation model for an ASW campaign. Note: The number of
attacks presented serves to illustrate that multiple attacks are possible.
Figure 1 illustrates a red submarine operation cycle and the blue ASW campaign
to combat it. For instance, a red submarine spends a number of days in port (6 days are
depicted in the Figure 1). While in port, it is subject to daily in port attacks. The
probability that it survives is a function of the number of days spent in port and daily
survival rate, which is affected by the magnitude of the blue offensive. Surviving the in
port attacks, the red submarine begins to transit toward its operational area. Along the
way, the blue forces have assembled various ASW barriers. (Four barriers are depicted in




barrier, the ASW attacks during the sub transit of the barrier, and the number of barriers.
These barriers will be explained in more detail in a later section.
When the red submarine arrives in its op area, it is subject to attrition by ASW
forces in the op area each day it remains there. In addition to the daily effectiveness of
blue offensive ASW forces, the probability of red survival in the op area is a function of
the engagement rate of the submarine and the blue screen's capability. The screen must
detect and then prosecute based on the detection. Once the red submarine leaves the op
area it is again subject to ASW barriers during its return transit to port. The cycle is
complete when the red submarine reaches port. The expected number of attacks it makes
and the probability of kill for the cycle is recorded.
B. REGIMES - DEFINITIONS AND EQUATIONS
The equations are broken down into the four regimes (shown in gray): in port
attacks, outbound barriers, operational areas, and inbound barriers. Figure 2 shows an
example of the user's data form. It is used for data input, viewing a record of output and
accessing other forms such as help files and the data set being created.
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The input regimes depicted in Figure 2 in the dark gray boxes are described in
detail below. Each regime description below is encapsulated in a light gray box like
this to provide continuity and clarity The equations for each regime are presented to
provide an understanding of how the results are determined. The final section of this
chapter provides the equations for the calculated Results (shown in the green box). The
term record refers to a data set entry consisting of inputs and results an entire patrol
calculation. Each time the "Calculate" button is clicked a new record is created that can
be added to the data set. (See the Appendix A for data base navigation.)
(The numberspresented in thefollowing descriptions ofinput and output arejust
an example and do not represent a real world campaign.)
V*
Figure 2. Example ofASW circulation model main data form. This form is used for
inputting parameters, calculations, viewing a single record and accessing other features such




1. Initial Red Sub Fraction
The nature of the model provides for multiple runs of the model or aggregated
campaigns. For a typical first run or patrol of a red submarine force the initial red sub
fraction is one.
initial Ked bub rraction
i
1
Figure 3. Example of user input for the initial red submarine fraction box
When the red submarine force has been attrited by one or more previous patrols, then the
initial red subfraction becomes the expected "redfraction remaining" from the previous
run. The "redfraction remaining" is given in the green results box.
Red Fraction
Remaining I 0.67661
Figure 4. Example of output for the fraction of red submarine force remaining
2. In Port Regime
For simplicity of the model, only attacks against the red submarine are of interest.
As mentioned previously only direct attacks are accounted for in the model calculations.
Examples of direct attacks on a submarine are bombing, missile attack, and hull mining.
Less direct and effective attacks must be accounted for by increased in port time due to
bombing of submarine piers, repair facilities, weapon storage facilities, communication





P(Survival) := qPort = Probability of survival of the red submarine in port
# Days := Dport = Number of Days the red submarine spends in port
IN PORT ATTACK
PCSvxviral) 0.999 #Days
Figure 5. Example of user input for the in port attack box
The in port survival formulation is: qlnPort = qPort Dport (1)
The model formulation to this point is:
PSubSimklnPort = (1 - Redlnit • qlnPort) (2)
3. Outbound Regime
The outbound barriers can take the form of any anti-submarine tactic that hinders
the red submarine's progress to its op area. Examples include harbor and sea lane
mining, traditional Naval ASW consisting of submarines, P-3s, destroyers, and others,
and various assets used for C4ISR such as aircraft and satellites for communication
interception and reconnaissance. Any of these assets can be used alone or as an
aggregated barrier. The probability of survival through any barrier must be determined
by the user prior to execution of the model. This will require a prior determination of the
assets to be assigned to the ASW barrier which in turn determines the probability of
survival of the red submarine passing through the barrier. Along with this determination
it is important that the user have a variety of barrier survival probabilities for various
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Event Description := Text description of barrier
P(Survival) := qOut,- = Probability of red sub surviving one blue attack event in barrier i
# Events := NOut = Number or type of events of the outbound barrier
An example of the outbound formulation for 4 barriers is:
qOutf • qOut2 • qOut\ • qOut4
where the first barrier has 2 events, the second and fourth have 1 event, and the third has
5 events.
OUTBOUND BARRIERS
Event Description F(S*iivJwal) # Events
Figure 6. Example of user input for the outbound barrier box
The Outbound survival formulation is:
-
• Out
qOutbound = 1 IqOut"'
f=i
(3)
where qOut? is the probability ofsurvivalfor barrier i, n
;
is the number ofdays in
barrier i and N0ut is the number or type ofOutbound barriers.
The model formulation to this point is:
PSubSunkOutbound = Redlnit • qlnPort •(!- qOutbound) (4)
4. Operational Area Regime
The operational area of the blue forces is defined as the area where the blue ships




submarine. The blue ASW campaign objective is to successfully operate in this area
while minimizing ship loss to red submarines.
Merchant or cargo vessels are generally thought of as defenseless against a
submarine. They can travel independently or in convoys, with protective escort or
without. High value units (HVU) such as aircraft carriers, while somewhat defenseless





Figure 7. Wire diagram of red submarines' transit through a blue Operational Area.
OP AREA ATTACK
User entries:
P(Survive Offensive) := qOff = Probability of red sub surviving daily offensive ASW
P(Screen Detects Sub) := Pd = Probability blue screen detects the red sub that attempts
to attack a target
P(Red Killed | Blue Detects) := Pk|d = Probability blue kills red given red is detected
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Daily # of Engagements ™ Engage = Number of red attacks plus blue detections based
on a daily rate or number of attempted attacks by red sub per day
# Red Days in Op Area := Dop = Number of days the red sub spends in operational
area (model assumes sub does not exhaust its torpedoes)
I OP AREA ATTACK
P(Survi»e Blue Daily Offensive) 98 |
PfScreen Detects Sub) 0.06 i
P(Su]> Killedl Screen Deiects) 0.09 1
Daily# of Engagements 2 j
i # Red Days in. Op Area 10 i
Figure 8. Example of user input for the operational area attack box
Useful relations:
(1 - qOff) = Probability of red sub being killed by (daily) offensive ASW
Pd • Pk\d = Probability of red sub being killed by a screen attack
(1 - Pd* Pdk\d) = Probability of red sub surviving a screen attack
Daily Probability of Red Sub Being Sunk in the Op Area
Engage-\
PSubSunkOnlstDay = (1- qOff) + qOff • Pd • Pk\d • ^(l-Pd* Pk\d) 1
;=0
(5)
let qDailyOpArea = 1 - PSubSunkOnlstDay
Probability of Red Sub Being Sunk in the Op Area
Dop-l




If < Engage <1 then the daily probability of the red sub being sunk is handled
in a special way explained below. If the number of days in the op area is less than one,
then these probabilities are zero. IfEngage =0 but Dop >= 1 then the red submarine is
being killed only by the screen and the probability of the red sub being sunk is:
Dop-




Equation 6a or 6b is the equation to this point.
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Attacks Achieved:
Daily Op Area Attacks Achieved by the Red Sub
Engage-l
DailyAttacksAchieved = qOff • (1 - Pd) • ]T (1 - Pd • Pk\d) k
fc=0
(7)
Total Op Area Attacks Achieved by the Red Sub:
Dop-l




Fractional Number of Engagements:
The model allows for the case where the number of engagements is between 0.0
and 1.0 since a fractional number in this range seems realistic for a daily engagement
rate. Fractional values greater than one are not allowed but attacks per day (2, 3, 4, ...)
are permitted. The fractional case is handled by adjusting the daily offensive ASW and
the number of days the red sub spends in the op area. This allows the number of
engagements (Engage) to take on the integer value 1 which is necessary for the software
programming. The new values become:
Engage is a fraction so Engage* => 1,
qOff*=qOff/ Engage,
Dop* = Dop / Engage.
This summation assumes that the number of engagements is greater than zero. If
the number of engagements is zero then the model accounts for this by ignoring the
engagement term.
5. Inbound Regime
The inbound barriers can take the form of any anti-submarine tactic that hinders




Event Description := Text description of barrier
P(Survival) := qln7- = Probability of red sub surviving one blue attack event in barrier i
# Events := NIn = Number of events of the Inbound barrier
INBOUND BARRIERS
Event Description PfSuivival) # Events





Figure 9. Example of user input for the Inbound barrier box
The Inbound survival formulation is: qlnbound = I I qln"'
i=l
(9)
where qln"' is the probability ofsurvivalfor barrier i, n
i
is the number ofdays in
barrier i and NIn is the number or types ofInbound barriers.
Letting:
• qlnPort = 1 - PSubSunklnPort,
• qOutbound = 1 - pSubSunkOutbound,
• qOpArea = 1 - PSubSunklnOpArea
the equation to this point becomes:
PSubSimklnbound = Redlnit • qlnport • qOutbound • qOpArea • (1 - qlnbound) ( 1 0)
6. Output Results
The probability results can be interpreted as the fraction, on the average, of the
red submarine force remaining after one patrol or cycle. The user must decide if the
submarine threat has been sufficiently reduced in this one patrol based on the desires and
capabilities of the campaign plan. Also considered must be the number of attacks the red
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submarine is able to achieve keeping in mind the simplifying assumption that the red






I 0.25527 InBound 0.02495
Daily
0.02335 1st Day
I 0.03056 Total Patrol I 0.32339




Figure 10. Example of user output for the record results box
P(SubSunk):
In Port :~ Probability the sub is sunk in port after Nport days in port
PSubSunklnPort = 1 - Redlnit • qPort Nport
Outbound = Probability the sub is sunk in an outbound barrier
PSubSunkOutbound = Redlnit • qlnPort • (1 - qOutbound)
(H)
(12)
Op Area - First Day := Probability sub is sunk the first day in the operational
area
Engage-]
PSubSunkOnXstDay = (1 - qOff) + qOff *Pd*Pk\d* £ (1 - Prf • Pk\d) 1
i=0
(13)
Op Area := Probability sub is sunk in the operational area
PSubSunklnOpArea =
Dop-\
Redlnit • qlnPort • qOutbound • PSubSunkOnXstDay • /,(!- qDailyOpArea) J
j=0
(14)
Inbound :~ Probability sub is sunk in an inbound barrier
PSubSunklnbound = Redlnit • qlnport • qOutbound • qOpArea • (1 - qlnbound) (15)
Total ;- Total probability sub is. sunk {entire patrol}
TotalPSubSunk - 1 - Redlnit • qlnport • qOutbound • qOpArea • qlnbound ( 1 6)
Attacks Achieved:
Daily := Number of daily attacks achieved
Engage-\






Total := Total number of attacks achieved
Dop-\




C. SOFTWARE AND CODING
The Joint Anti-Submarine Warfare Model uses a graphical user interface (GUI)
created in Borland Delphi™ for Microsoft Windows . It requires Windows 3.x or
later to run the executable file, 16-bit and 32-bit versions are available.
This model is written to evaluate an ASW campaign utilizing various assets in
ASW roles. The model provides the user an interface to enter the survival probabilities
along with other related campaign parameters based on available ASW resources. The
user is then provided as output the survival probabilities in three regimes, an overall
survival prediction of the red submarine as well as the number of daily and total attacks
the red submarine can achieve. Finally, the input and output are stored as a data base for
further evaluation. This information can aide in determining force mix while providing
an idea of how much of a submarine attack the blue forces are willing to endure.
Once the model was structured it was made interactive using the low level
computer programming language PASCAL in Delphi. Other programming languages,
analysis tools or graphical interfaces could have been used in a similar fashion. The
ability of the model to be dynamic and interactive allows the user to easily tailor his
ASW campaign forces to the model regimes. Along with applying traditional and joint
.» ,
ASW assets, new ASW employment and tactics specifically designed for the areas along
the littoral could easily be analyzed.
The flexibility of the input parameters allow use of all available assets as well as
the ability to easily incorporate new technologies as they become available. A working
knowledge of how various probabilities of kills and ASW barrier strategies is assumed
and necessary for valid data input and interpretation of the results. (A description of a
circulation model and survival probabilities is presented in McCue, 1990.) Along with
the application of assets, the varying of the asset mix to achieve the best possible ASW
strategy without drawing too many assets from other areas of the campaign is explained.
This critical mixing is the key to the joint applicability of the model. All available assets
must be "fully" utilized. If some assets are over utilized by one facet of the war then the
attempt at full utilization is wrong. For example, if B-52s are allocated to the ground
campaign for large area bombing when the ground war is actually being delayed because
enemy submarines are slowing the resupply effort then B-52s are not being properly
utilized. Using the B-52s for a few days of submarine port bombing or harbor mining
may be a better way to fully utilize available assets. The same is true if B-52s are
performing ASW missions when the ground campaign is the primary focus of attack.
This is the mind set the model user must achieve to begin to tap the benefits of a joint
ASW model.
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D. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE MODEL INTERFACE
Due to a number of factors, including time and inexperience with the software,
certain shortcomings of the usable model exist which must be known. These
shortcomings are simply issues that the user should be aware of when using this
analytical tool.
1. Limited Input Value Ranges
Abnormal values such as probabilities less than zero are not allowed by the
model. The model will only accept values in the allowed ranges. The user will receive
an error message and be prompted for another input if a value is outside the allowed
range.
The ranges of allowed values are:
• All probabilities and "Initial Red Sub Fraction" = {0.0, 1 .0},
• Number of days and events = {0, 999} (this must be an
integer value),
• Number of engagements = {0.0, 1 .0} and {1 , 99 (integer
values >1)}
• Event descriptions = 20 characters or less
• Memo Record = 50 characters or less
The default parameters are such that not all of the input parameters need to be
entered. The data is entered in a screen which is defined as the main form of the model.
All other screens or forms can be accessed from the main form. In order to input data,
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click on the desired input box and type a value. It may be necessary to delete the value
that is already in the box by backspacing or highlighting and deleting the value. It is
possible to tab through the input boxes and enter values without having to delete old
values.
2. Number Of Days And Engagements Per Day
Some values such as the number of days must be an integer value since these
values are part of a summation or product index which is handled by program looping.
The same is true of the number of engagements for values greater that or equal to one.
The special case where the number of engagements is a fraction in the range of {0.0, 1.0}
is coded by number manipulation and then rounding the value of the number of
engagements to one. This number manipulation was explained in detail in the section on
"Op Area Attack " This fractional range was deemed important and easily codable for
the model, but whole numbers greater than one are allowed.
3. Limited Number Of Barriers
Only four outbound and inbound barriers are allowed for a single patrol due size
limitations of the input screen. This has, thus far, not been a problem for any verification
campaigns.
4. Simple Help Files
The graphical interface does not allow the use of pull down menus like some
software products because of time and the complexity of the coding required to
accomplish these tasks. The help available to the user during the running of the model
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consists of a number of scrollable text files. If this is insufficient then the user's manual
(Appendix A) or this thesis can be used.
5. Rounding Output
Values had to be rounded to five decimal places to fit on the main form screen.
This should not be a problem given the accuracy of most probability information.
6. Time Steps
The selection of daily and event time steps is based on convenience and is
supported by previous models [Eagle, 1987] and [Washburn, 1980], The time step need
not be one 24 hour day but simply a convenient unit of time that is consistent for all
regimes. For example, a time step of one hour can be used provided that each regime
uses the same time step. This can be done by adjusting the value for the number "days"
in port, "days" in the op area, and the "daily" number of engagements to hours. The
number of barrier events must also be adjusted accordingly. This may be another way to
account for a fractional engagement rate.
7. What The Model Does Not Know In The Op Area
The model is not able to know if the red submarine has sufficient weapons to
continue attacking for the inputted number of days in the operational area. Along these
lines, the model cannot know if the red submarine would interrupt its attack cycle due to
damage or some other reason. The damage in hits achieved by a red submarine attack is
not a part of the model. Instead, just the number of attack opportunities are tallied and
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the user must decide how many merchant ships or warships were put out of action or
sunk in each attack. Also, the time required for individual engagements cannot be easily




IV. USING THE MODEL AND DATA MANIPULATION
Each set of input parameters is considered a record for the database which is
being built when the database navigator is used. (See section VI for navigator
instructions.) Therefore, the results displayed when the "Calculate" button is clicked are
for that particular record of input parameters. A record need not be entered in the data
base after each calculation. Once a desired record is achieved it is recommended that the
record be entered in the data base for future reference. Each record can be made unique
and recognizable by entering a record memo of text.
Record Memo
{Campaign 1
Figure 11. Example of user input for a record memo
•The data is entered in a screen which is defined as the main form of the model.
AH other screens or forms can be accessed from the main form. In order to input
data, click on the desired input box and type a value. It may be necessary to delete
the value that is already in the box by backspacing or highlighting and deleting the value.
It is possible to tab through the input boxes and enter values without having to delete
old values. Entering improper values will result in an error message
The default parameters are such that not all of the input parameters need be
entered. For instance, if no in port information is entered then a default qPort
(Probability ofred sub survival in port) equal to 1.0 and a default Dport (Number ofdays
the red sub is in port) equal to 0.0 would be used having no effect on other calculations.
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V. BUTTONS AND FORMS
In order to perform a calculation with the parameters entered in the input boxes
the user must click the "Calculate" button in the middle of the main form screen.
Figure 12. Calculate and Exit buttons
Clicking this button performs the above described equations by the executable program.
To exit the model normally, the user can click the "Exit" button.
View All Data View Jesuits Qnly| Help About Model
|
Figure 13. View data, Help, and About buttons
Viewing a table of the data is possible while running the model is possible by
clicking on one of the view buttons. The "View All Data" button allows viewing of a
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Campaign 2b 0.670:54 1 3
Campaign 2a 0.70157 1 SSN Attack 0.985 2
Campaign 2 1 0.999 20 B-52 Minefif 996 1 Sub Attack










0.998 1 Sub Attack
0.996 1 Sub Attack
Figure 14. Example of the Data Summary form
The "View Results" button allows viewing of a scroll-able table containing the record
memos along with the calculated results values. A database navigator is also provided to
manipulate each table
.f«i
ASW Model Results Form
^r Rrt.ujrn to- Main Results Summary
Print Report i C"
Survival Probabilities Attacks Achieved-


























































The help function offers a number of scroll-able help files which provide
information ranging from basic model description and its use to equations which are used
to determine the results. The various help forms can be accessed by clicking in the radial
button for the desired help topic.
41 ASW Model Help Menu ^1
s/ Back To Main
HELP TOPICS
f~ Model Purpose and Description
f Data Entry and Manipulation
P Navigating the Data Base
<~ Equations
Range of allowed values
:
All probabilities and Initial Red Sub Fraction = {0.0, 1
.0},
Number of 'lays = {0, 999}, (this must be an integer),
Number of events = {0.0, 99.0}, (this can be a real value),
Number ofengagements = {0.0, 1 .0} and { 1, 99} (integer values > 1),
Event descriptions = 20 characters or less,
Memo Record = 50 characters or less
The default parameters are such that not all of the input parameters
need be manually entered.
j
U ' "~ " J
*** Three Easy Steps To Calculate A Campaign ***
1
.
Type inputs in the white boxes. (Use mouse or tab key to get to white boxes.)
2. Click the "Calculate" button.
3. View the output in the aqua results boxes.
— Read these help files and the user's manual for more in depth model explanation,
data manipulation, equation definition and other information.
Figure 16. Example of the Help Menu form





V. NAVIGATING THE DATA BASE
The database navigator component (TDBNavigator) enables users to navigate
through records and to perform operations such as inserting records and posting changes.
TDBNavigator enables users to navigate a data base and manipulate its data interactively.
The navigator provides a series of buttons that enables a user to scroll forward or
backward through records one at a time, go to the first record, go to the last record, insert
a new record, update an existing record, post data changes, cancel data changes, delete a
record, and refresh record display. Not all of the buttons are available in every form.
Clicking the "+" adds the current input and output values to the data base as a
record. A record is one complete cycle consisting of input and output values. Clicking
the "+" also inserts the default values into the input boxes. These default values can be
left as or modified as deemed necessary by the user.
Simply entering values in the input fields does not change the data base. A
variety of patrol calculations can be done without entering them into the data base by
clicking the "Calculate" button (and not clicking the "+" on the TDBNavigator). Once
the "+" is clicked the record is added to the data base and it can be accessed again.
Accessing a database record simplifies data entry because some or all of the old record
values can be viewed and used. Once an old record is accessed (using the arrows on the
TDBNavigator), the record can be altered by entering different input values and clicking
the "Calculate" button. The modified record can then replace the old record by clicking
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the "+" or modified again until the desired input is achieved. The values can then be




Next Insert Edit Cancel
I i I I
H A 1 + - • X e
Prior Last Delete Post Refresh
Figure 17. The database navigator (TDBNavigator)
First
Moves to the first row in a dataset by calling the First method.
Prior
Moves to the previous row in a dataset by calling the Prior method.
Next
Moves to the next row in a dataset by calling the Next method.
Last
Moves to the last row in a dataset by calling the Last method.
Insert
Inserts a new row above the current row in a dataset by calling the Insert method, and
places the dataset in Insert state.
Delete
Deletes the current row in a dataset by calling the Delete method. If the ConfirmDelete
property is True, it prompts for confirmation before deletion.
Edit
Places the dataset in Edit state and enables the user to edit data by calling the Edit
method.
Post
Posts the current row in a dataset by calling the Post method.
Cancel
Cancels changes made to the current row in a dataset by calling the Cancel method, and
returns the dataset to Browse state.
Refresh
Refreshes the display of a dataset with current data from the database by calling the
Refresh method. Useful if another user or application changes the underlying data. It is
necessary to use this in all of the forms since all of the forms utilize the same dataset.
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VI. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
"No other single weapon available to the world's regional powers today




The change in the world situation has prompted the emergence of an old problem
that was never completely solved. The diesel threat was virtually disregarded during the
development of nuclear power for submarines and the subsequent build up of the Soviet
submarine force. ASW resources throughout the 1970s and 1980s were centered on the
nuclear threat (SSNs/SSGNs) but the in the 1990s the threat has shifted to the
significantly less expensive but prevalent diesel. Better use of available assets coupled
with new tactics are required to deal with the diesel submarine.
The circulation model adapted for use in this thesis provides a flexible, robust
approach to ASW campaign analysis. To rapidly respond there must be a plan for such a
campaign. The aim of this thesis was to provide a tool to the military decision-maker, a
large-scale, aggregated, highly flexible model of the ASW campaign that is not limited
by force mix or tactics. The user friendly campaign decision aid developed in this thesis
provides an integrated look at all the ASW forces' effects in concert, and the total threat
of a submarine fleet to shipping (or warships) over their operating lifetime. The
deliverable graphical user interface is the analytical tool for flexible and robust ASW
campaign analysis.
More specifically, the model allows for changing threats, unlimited tactics,
unlimited force mix, and varying campaign lengths. It uses fixed time steps of days and
number of events for the various regimes which seem to characterize ASW campaign
analyses. In fact, the unit of time for an entire patrol can be altered by the user if the
desired.
This thesis develops a model distributable as a graphical user interface (GUI) for
an antisubmarine warfare campaign. The use of the GUI as an analytical tool can aid in
the planning and analysis of naval and joint force mix to combat an ASW threat. The
GUI is based on the circulation model developed by Jack Hall (Hall, 1969). Instead of
limiting the user to uniquely naval assets and specific blue water tactics, this model
allows the user the flexibility to utilize all available ASW assets in any manner or tactic
desired.
The model was developed in Borland® Delphi™ for use in Microsoft®
Windows. It is distributable with a nearly empty database and the necessary
configuration software (Borland Database Engine® and Reportsmith®) to set up and run
the executable file. The file can be run from a file manager or a File|Run command
window.
Some problems encountered with the model and its coding are discussed in the
previous chapter. Two notable observations of the model are:
1.
A shortcoming of the model which is not easy to properly account for is that a
red submarine will continue to conduct engagements until the inputted number of days is
completed. This occurs regardless whether the red submarine force may have fired all its
torpedoes or whether blue targets remain in the operational area.
2. The model alone does not offer techniques for obtaining the required input
parameters. However, the text of the thesis does suggest ideas of how forces other than
naval ASW assets can be utilized in an ASW role.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Continued attention to a comprehensive campaign-wide concept of dealing with
the submarine threat is recommended. More importantly, increased analysis of the use of
non-uniquely naval ASW assets in an ASW role must be conducted. This will not be
possible until all the services including the Navy comprehend the threat of an attack
submarine, nuclear or diesel.
Regarding the Model:
1. The simplistic nature of the circulation model has its limitations. Future
development of an ASW campaign or increased complexity may overcome or
sidestep these limitations.
2. Optimization of each regime could be extremely helpful to the user's analysis.
Along this line, optimization of a particular campaign could be conducted and
incorporated into the user's manual.
3. More realistic time steps could be developed to account for varying lengths of
time in the barrier regime and the time of individual engagements.
4. The duration of the operational area regime can be improved to account for
the number of red submarine weapons and send the red submarines home
after a given number of attacks.
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Regarding the software:
1. The creation of a graphical user interface (GUI) was to make the model a
deliverable and usable product. It is not necessary to use a GUI to develop a
campaign but the software calculations are a great deal simpler and faster.
The development of a simple, user friendly is the most significant
accomplishment of this thesis.
2. Borland Delphi was chosen as the software platform because of its availability
and ease of use. A similar GUI could have been created in JAVA, Virtual
Basic or even C++. The use of these other programming mediums may yield
improved interfaces.
3. Database interaction and help pages are areas which can be improved upon to
make the model more user friendly.
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